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Collective	Capability	in	Multi	Agency	Services		
Peter	Johnson	University	of	Bath,	UK,	
Harry	Daniels	University	of	Oxford,	UK,	
Grace	William	Defence	Science	&	Technology	Laboratory,	UK.		
	This	paper	develops	a	conceptual	framework	for	supporting	the	development	of	systems	to	support	Collective	Capability	(CC)	in	Multi	Agency	Services	(MAS).	In	particular	it	develops	a	conceptual	basis	for	Human-Agent	collaborations	in	multi	organization	federations	developing	and	delivering	services	and	providing	a	joined	up	collective	capability.	In	that	context	a	further	crucial	aspect	of	this	conceptual	framework	is	in	ensuring	situational	awareness		(SA)	is	achieved	within	a	multi-organization	federation.	In	the	paper	we	further	address	the	need	for	situational	awareness	and	introduce	the	concepts	of	knotworking	and	relational	agency	as	mechanisms	for	achieving	SA	in	MAS.	In	addition	a	yet	further	significant	feature	is	that	of	the	need	for	the	CC	of	the	MAS	to	continually	learn	and	to	deliver	self-organization	of	services	in	multi-organization	federations.	In	this	context	we	develop	the	concept	of	expansive	learning.	Together	these	concepts	provide	a	conceptual	framework	to	support		CC	in	MAS.	Here	we	follow	Engeström	et	al.	(1999)	who	developed	the	concept	of	knotworking	to	describe	the	“construction	of	constantly	changing	combinations	of	people	and	artefacts	over	lengthy	trajectories	of	time	and	widely	distributed	in	space”	(p.	345).	Whereas	the	notion	of	expansive	learning	embodies	the	idea	of	learning	what	is	not	yet	there.	Rather	than	learning	the	existing	rules	in	a	setting	it	is	learning	or	creating	new	understandings.		In	the	settings	of	inter-professional	activity	which	concern	us	relational	agency	is	a	capacity	for	fluid	and	responsive	work.	It	involves	working	with	others	to	recognise	and	respond	to	what	matters	for	each	profession	in	complex	professional	activities.		MAS	failures	cause	ineffectiveness	and	inefficiency,	and	cost	both	lives	and	resources	e.g.	as	seen	in	‘Baby	P’,	‘7/7’,	‘9/11’	and	Hurricane	Katrina.	In	the	contexts	of	defence	and	security	situations	there	are	often	multiple	groups	the	military	have	to	work	with	(i.e.	military	allies,	community,	police,	government,	adversary	groups)	who	all	have	multiple	goals	as	well	as	having	to	take	into	account	the	various	cultural	differences	influencing	and	effecting	those	goals.	Challenges	include,	lack	of	cross-service	collaboration,	agility	and	responsiveness.	Effective	MAS	requires	agile	and	flexible	solutions	in	the	face	of	complex	and	rapidly	changing	situations.	We	characterise	the	underpinning	challenges	in	terms	of	three	types	of	information	flow	and	knowledge	creation	failures:	1.	Codesign	of	Responsive	services,	by	service	agencies	and	users;	2.	Collaborative	Knowledge	Sharing	across	service	agencies	to	establish	common	knowledge;	and	3.	Strategic	Learning	between	multiple	service	strategists,	policy	makers	and	deliverers	to	ensure	agile	systemic	response.	Underlying	these	information	flow	and	knowledge	creation	failures	are	generic	problems	with	data,	models	and	inferences.	Current	technologies	have	failed	in	many	respects	–	being	unfit	for	purpose,	not	providing	the	right	information	at	the	right	time,	causing	information	overload	and	in-effective	working	in	large	service	agencies	(e.g.,	military,	health	services).		ICT	in	MAS	is	often	rule	bound,	good	for	ensuring	compliance	but	enforcing	rigidity	and	inflexibility.	Moreover,	these	rules	are	not	shared	across	all	groups	and	communities	and	ignore	the	informal,	social,	customs	and	values.	Consequently,	people	find	“work	arounds”	or	hide	their	“rule	breaking	&	bending”.		To	overcome	these	limitations	we	must	identify	and	explain	causal	relationships	between	the	complex	properties	of	MAS	that	allow	us	to	develop	and	assess	revolutionary	technologies	to	collect,	represent,	share	and	manipulate	information	and	create	knowledge	in	dynamic	and	responsive	systems.	Collective	Capability	(CC)	is	created	when	disparate	groups	and	individuals	share	information	and	knowledge,	collaborate	and	develop	relational	agency.	For	this	to	happen	there	must	be	cultures	and	technologies	that	support	responsiveness,	working	together	and	learning.		Our	vision	is	to	create	a	science	and	technology	of	CC	that	can	underpin	the	design,	building	and	use	of	systems	to	enable	collaborative,	agile,	responsive	and	efficient	MAS.	That	will	enable	multiple	agencies	to	work	dynamically	and	smoothly	together	to	provide	effective	and	efficient	MAS	and	prevent	service	breakdowns.	This	will	require	1.user	engagements	in	multi-agency	services	(responsiveness),	2.	improved	common	knowledge	and	3.	Improved	specialised	knowledge	and	understanding	within	and	across	group	interactions	(working	together),	and	4.	learning	within	and	across	strategic	and	operational	aspects	of	practice.	This	will	be	realised	through	collaborative	technologies	and	practices	that	together	provide	a	collective	capability	approach	to	delivering	MAS	that	are	valued,	timely	and	relevant	to	the	needs	of	people	and	situations.	This	paper	investigates	Collective	Capability	(CC)	through	three	conceptual	themes	–					
• collective	responsiveness	(CR),		
• collective	knowledge	(CK)	and		
• collective	learning(CL).		 					In	other	words	it	relates	to	data	collection	interpretation	and	inference	technologies	(CR),	knowledge	sharing	and	knowledge	representation	technologies	(CK);	technologies	for	learning	(CL)		
	Collective	Responsiveness requires	collective	decision-making,	co-design,	adaptation	and	personalisation	This	involves	decision-making	using	mathematical	system	modelling	alongside	human	individual	and	collective	judgements	developing	software	tools	as	collective	decision-making	aids	for	service	providers.	It	must	enable	strategic	and	operational	flexibility	in	decision-making,	developing	decision-making	software	layers	for	rapid	recording	“apps”	that	utilise	sensor	networks	to	allow	the	user	to	easily	record	novel	strategic	and	operational	decision	taking.	It	must	avoid	regression	to	the	mean	in	collectives,	developing	social	networking	tools	for	co-creation	of	knowledge	and	services.	
Collective	Knowledge	requires	knowledge	representations,	access	and	assessment	support	collaborative	knowledge	building	through	data/information/knowledge	collection	/refinement	processes,	with	software	processes	for	real-time	multi-user	data/information/knowledge	collection/refutation/refinement.	There	must	be	personalised,	contextually	relevant	representation	of	collective	knowledge,	with	software	tools	and	representations	that	personalise	collective	knowledge	to	the	individuals	needs,	contexts	and	platforms.	In	addition	there	will	be	collective	knowledge	structures	(semantic,	pragmatic	and	event	based)	supporting	multi-faceted	knowledge	gathering	and	mining	tools	to	access	and	manipulate	collective	knowledge	structures.	
Collective	Learning	requires	knowledge	creation,	restructuring,	generalisation	and	transfer.	This	raises	the	trust,	privacy	and	security	issues	that	support	collective	learning.	Addressed	through	providing	large-scale	simulations	for	probabilistic	models	to	predict	and	learn	trust/privacy/security	properties.	It	further	requires	the	spread	and	growth	of	learning	within	and	across	agencies	from	individual	to	whole.	Delivered	through	scale-free	networks	which	form	the	basis	for	emerging	spread	and	growth	leading	to	Collective	learning.	A	further	requirement	is	to	make	trade-offs	between	“rule	breaking”	and	learning	through	developing	safe	environments	that	encourage	and	facilitate	experimentation	and	analysis	of	solutions	to	problems.		Acts	of	rule	breaking	and	micro	acts	of	defiance	are	interesting	as	they	indicate	stress	points	and	indicate	how	people	get	around	rigid	systems	or	use	systems	in	unintended	ways	to	get	results.	Also,	if	there	are	uniform	‘work	arounds”	these	can	then	be	incorporated	into	a	structured	evolutionary	approach	of	Collective	Learning.		
Two	Case	Studies	of	Multi-Agent	Systems	and	their	Current	Working		
Case	study	One:	Emergency	and	disaster	relief	In	the	case	of	emergencies	on	the	scale	of	disasters	such	as	hurricane	Katrina	and	more	recently	the	Fukushima	nuclear	power	plant	crisis	both	military	and	civilian	groups	work	closely	together	with	each	other	and	the	local	community	to	respond	to	the	emergency	and	bring	about	a	safe	and	stable	situation.	There	are	significant	challenges	and	issues	with	the	current	way	that	these	agencies	work.	In	both	the	case	of	Katrina	and	Fukushima	there	are	rich	examples	of	failures	in	the	agencies	involved	to		
• work	together		
• recognise	when	ways	of	working	were	creating	problems	
• develop	new	ways	of	working	
• act	responsively	and	in	ways	appropriate	to	the	needs		
Fukushima	First	let’s	consider	Fukushima,	Daiichi	Nuclear	Power	Station	(NPS)	in	Fukushima,	Japan	was	struck	with	an	earthquake	and	tsunami.	This	resulted	in	a	nuclear	emergency	that	was	made	worse	by	communication	gaps	between	the	government,	nuclear	industry	and	the	general	public.		First	a	(very)	brief	overview	of	events:	March	11	14:46	9-0	earthquake.	Nuclear	Power	Station	automatically	shuts	down.	March	11	14:48	Power	Substation	out	of	service.	March	11	15:27	Tsunami	1.	March	11	15:35	Tsunami	2	.	March	11	15:32	Station	Blackout	(whiteboard	memo).	...Emergency	Diesel	Generators	rendered	inoperable	due	to	flooding	in	basement...	March	12	15:00	power	connected.	
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March	12	15:36	Hydrogen	Explosion(s)	Unit	1	loosing	containment.	March	14	11:01	Hydrogen	Explosion	Unit	3	loosing	containment.	March	15	6:00-6:10	Hydrogen	Explosion	Unit	4	loosing	containment.		Now	let’s	look	at	a	very	specific	and	interesting	event	that	occurred:		
Yoshida	ignores	command	and	continues	to	pump	seawater.	Following	the	earthquake	Yoshida,	the	site-head,	pumped	seawater	into	the	NPS	reactor	to	prevent	the	core	from	overheating.	Around	12:00	Yoshida	decided	to	make	preparations	to	start	a	seawater	pump	and	ordered	an	in	house	fire-fighting	team	to	start	to	research	the	configuration	for	a	line	configuration	or	seawater	injection	(Committee,	I.	2011).	At	this	point,	apparently,	no	one	at	TEPCO	HQ	was	opposed	to	injecting	seawater.	When	the	NPS	ran	out	of	freshwater	at	14.53	March	12th	(AJW,	T.A.S	2011),	it	needed	to	start	pumping	seawater	into	Unit	1(Committee,	I.	2011)	in	order	to	cool	the	reactor.	Such	an	important	decision	normally	requires	the	president	of	the	Tokyo	Electric	Power	Company	(TEPCO)	to	sign	off	on	it	(AJW,	T.A.S	2011).	The	start	of	the	seawater	pump	was	approved	by	TEPCO	president	Masataka	Shimizu.		At	around	14:54,	Yoshida	ordered	the	seawater	to	be	pumped	into	the	Unit.	(Committee,	I.	2011).	At	around	15:18,	Yoshida	reported	to	government	bodies	that	they	would	start	injecting	seawater	once	freshwater	supplies	were	gone	(Committee,	I.	2011).	Kan	asked	about	the	criticality	of	the	damaged	fuel	in	unit	1	reactor	that	may	result	from	pumping	seawater.	The	chairman	of	the	nuclear	safety	commission,	Madarame,	replied	that	after	sea	water	injection	such	a	possibility	“could	not	be	denied”	(Funabashi,	Y.,	Kitazawa,	K	2012).	Therefore	the	decision	to	continue	pumping	seawater	became	difficult.	As	a	result,	TEPCO	company	chief	Tapekuro	was	liaising	with	the	government	notified	the	TEPCO	head	office	that	further	water	injection	should	be	avoided	until	the	government	had	decided	on	a	course	of	action	(Funabashi,	Y.,	Kitazawa,	K	2012).	TEPCO	president	Shimizu	communicated	this	to	Yoshida	on-site	(via	teleconference	(AJW,	T.A.S	2011))	at	the	nuclear	power	plant.	The	decision	was	made	to	stop	pumping	seawater.	Yoshida	insisted	on	restarting	injections	as	soon	as	possible	(Funabashi,	Y.,	Kitazawa,	K	2012).	“During	a	teleconference,	Yoshida	called	the	employee	in	charge	of	the	seawater	injections	to	his	side	and	whispered	in	his	ear	so	the	microphone	for	the	teleconference	with	the	head	office	would	not	pick	up	his	voice	that	though	he	would	now	order	a	halt	to	the	seawater	injections,	the	employee	should	disregard	the	order	and	continue.	Thereupon,	Yoshida	loudly	declared	to	all	teleconference	participants	that	water	injections	would	be	interrupted."	(Funabashi,	Y.,	Kitazawa,	K	2012)”.	This	was	possibly	to	avoid	any	further	confrontation	with	the	government.	At	this	point	the	on-site	workers	were	going	directly	against	instructions	from	their	HQ.	Kan	instructed	the	seawater	to	resume	pumping	at	8:20pm	(AJW,	T.A.S	2011).	However,	the	pumping	of	seawater	had	never	stopped.	Now	let’s	consider	another	dimension	of	the	events	of	Fukushima	with	respect	to	developing	and	adopting	alternative	technologies.		
Crowd	Sourced	Radiation	Detection.	The	Japanese	government's	radiation	detection	system,	SPEEDI,	predicts	local	radiation	levels	(Chino,	M.,	Ishikawa,	H.,	Yamazawa,	H.,1993).	Information	concerning	radiation	levels,	provided	by	SPEEDI	was	withheld	from	the	general	public.	The	reports	produced	by	the	system	were	sent	to	Japan’s	nuclear	safety	agency.	However,	the	reports	were	not	acted	upon.	Consequently,	a	school	predicted	to	receive	dangerous	levels	of	radiation	was	turned	into	an	evacuation	shelter.	Due	to	a	lack	of	trust	in	official	reports	the	general	public	in	Japan	felt	there	was	a	growing	need	to	take	matters	into	their	own	hands. Crowd-sourced	geiger	counter	readings	from	all	over	Japan	were	and	are	still	being	aggregated	on	the	Pachube	platform	online	(Courtland,	R	,2011)	(now	called	Cosm	-	Developers,	C.:	https://cosm.com/).	The	Cosm	platform	works	by	allowing	users	to	collaborate	in	many	ways,	including	(i)	build	and	connect	their	own	devices,	(ii)	control,	monitor,	analyse	data,	(iii)	search	for	other	devices,	(iv)	browse	and	search	data	to	find	out	what	is	happening,	and	(v)	build	communities	and	conversations	around	data.	Websites	such	as	Safecast	(Safecast	Team:	http://blog.safecast.org/about/)	allow	users	to	submit	their	own	readings	and	view	their	readings	alongside	others'.	The	aim	of	Safecast	is	to	“empower	people	with	information	about	their	environment"	(Safecast	Team:	http://blog.safecast.org/about/).	Individuals	have	generated	maps	based	on	the	data.	For	instance,	Kalin	Kozhuharov	generated	a	map	displaying	mobile	data	using	google	fusion	tables	(Kozhuharov,	K.,	2011).	Also,	Lionel	Bergere	created	an	interpolation	map	that	uses	existing	geiger	counter	readings	and	attempts	to	fill	in	the	space	between	individual	readings	(see:	http://gamma.tar.bz/maps/static/).		In	these	reports	from	Fukushima	we	can	see	the	challenges	and	failings	that	the	government	and	industrial	agencies	experienced.	The	lack	of	shared	awareness		across	the	plant	operatives,	the	company	officials	and	
the	government	officials	resulted	in	conflicting	commands,	commands	not	being	obeyed	together	with	reporting	failures.	Similarly,	the	reliance	upon	central	data	collection	and	information	distribution	resulted	in	inaccurate	and	un-trusted	information	about	radiation	levels.	This	resulted	in	the	appropriation	of	an	emergent	technology	by	individuals	becoming	the	trusted	and	relied	upon	source.					
Katrina	Hurricane	Katrina	was	one	of	the	costliest	natural	disasters	to	strike	the	United	States	in	recent	years.	The	total	property	damage	is	estimated	at	$81	billion	and	at	least	1,836	people	lost	their	lives.	The	rescue	missions	that	took	place	following	the	events	were	subdivided	into	search,	rescue,	evacuation,	supply	and	delivery.	Temporary	organizations	were	created	and	the	command	structure	is	both	dynamic	and	readjusted	to	the	events	as	they	unfold	and	also	must	not	interfere	with	already	established	command	structures.	This	is	based	on	the	description	of	the	events	as	given	by	James	Moffat	in	“Modelling	and	Simulation	for	Network	Enabled	Operations”	and	the	report	“A	failure	of	Initiative”	US	House	of	Representatives	15th	February	2006	(see:		http://www.disastersrus.org/katrina/USHousereport.pdf).	Moffat	(page	86)	reports;	”One	day	after	landfall,	on	30th	August	2005	the	Joint	Task	Force	(JTF)	Katrina	was	established.	States	forwarded	their	requests	for	assistance	to	federal	civilian	officials,	and	these	requests	then	moved	through	a	series	of	military	channels.	Inherent	in	this	process	was	the	need	for	time	to	assess	the	capabilities	required	by	each	request	and	to	design	an	appropriate	military	response.	There	was,	at	this	early	stage	of	events,	an	incorrect	situational	awareness	and	understanding	at	the	DoD	level.	Civilian	and	military	decision-makers	throughout	the	government	apparently	judged	that	the	projected	flow	of	National	Guard	units	would	be	sufficient.	Only	on	the	30th	of	August	did	the	Deputy	Secretary	of	Defense	give	the	commander	in	charge	a	“blank	cheque”	for	any	DoD	resources,	and	on	31st	August	a	high	level	military	officer	still	“did	not	believe	that	federal	ground	forces	were	needed.”		Moffat	continues…(page	87);	“Federal	military	forces	lacked	situational	awareness	of	which	National	Guard	units	were	in	the	area	and	how	they	were	operating.	The	command	of	the	National	Guard	units	and	the	federal	level	could	not	exchange	information	due	to	incompatible	communication	systems.	No	unified	command	system	was	put	in	place	during	the	search	and	rescue,	evacuation,	and	supply	delivery	missions.	The	effect	was	that	of	having	multiple	rescue	teams	operating	in	the	same	area	while	other	areas	were	left	uncovered.	This	is	an	example	of	conflicted	command,	and	occurred	over	the	first	week	after	landfall,	from	29th	August	to	approximately	4th	September.	At	the	initial	stage	then,	conflicted	command	was	in	place.	Only	after	some	days	were	National	Guard	and	active-duty	units	deliberately	deployed	into	different	geographic	areas	where	they	carried	out	various	relief	and	rescue	missions	using	separate	command	structures,	increasing	the	command	approach	to	de-conflicted	command.”		Moreover	Moffat	reports	that	the	only	example	what	he	calls	“edge	command”	(page	89)	ie		agile	responsive	behaviour.		“This	was	the	response	of	an	individual	pharmacist	to	the	crisis	in	medical	supplies	in	New	Orleans.	He	raided	the	flooded	pharmacies	and	repositioned	these	supplies	in	local	downtown	hotels.	His	rich	understanding	of	the	situation	led	to	a	local	response	consistent	with	the	overall	intent—saving	lives.”p89.		These	are	just	some	of	the	reported	challenges	and	failings	that	the	civilian	and	military	agencies	were	faced	with	during	Hurricane	Katrina.		The	rules,	structures	and	procedures	of	the	different	agencies	prevented	the	distribution	of	information,	the	formation	of	collective	knowledge	and	the	dearth	of	agile	responsive	behaviour.	From	both	of	these	disaster	emergency	response	case	studies	we	can	begin	to	identify	requirements	to	overcome	the	shortcomings	of	the	socio-cultural,	and	working	practices	of	these	agencies.	We	argue	that	these	socio-cultural	and	working	practice	requirements	carry	with	them	requirements	for	improved	communication,	reporting,	commanding,	and	data	gathering	and	knowledge	sharing	and	decision	making	technologies.	
Case Study two: Local Authorities (LAs) and the Troubled Families programme LAs	face	many	challenges	as	they	seek	to	identify	and	work	with	‘troubled	families’.		These	families	almost	always	have	other	often	long-standing	problems	which	can	lead	to	their	children	repeating	the	cycle	of	disadvantage.		They	are	defined	as	households	who:	are	involved	in	crime	and	anti-social	behaviour;	have	children	not	in	school;	have	an	adult	on	out	of	work	benefits;	and	cause	high	costs	to	the	public	purse	(See	“The	Troubled	Families	
Programme”.	Communities	and	Local	Government.	Crown	Copyright	March	2012	
http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/2117840.pdf).	At	minimum	this	work	will	involve	agencies	concerned	with	crime,	education	and	employment.	However	central	government	is	also	encouraging	LAs	to	use	their	discretion	to	consider	with	local	partners,	such	as	health,	police	and	others	what	the	range	of	issues	is	that	they	will	use	to	prioritise	and	how	to	identify	the	families.	These	include		families:	containing	a	child	who	is	on	a	Child	Protection	Plan	or	with	a	looked	after	child;	subject	to	frequent	police	call-outs	or	arrests;	and	those	with	health	problems	such	as	emotional	and	mental	health	problems,	drug	and	alcohol	misuse,	long	term	health	conditions,	those	caused	by	domestic	abuse	and	under	18	conceptions.		Policy	requires	LA	to	take	a	systematic	and	strategic	approach	to	these	most	challenging	of	families	who	have	concerned	different	services	for	years.	The	first	step	involves	complex	and	challenging	Multi-agency	services	(MAS)	work	as	the	LA	compiles	a	list	of	families	who	will	be	part	of	the	subsequent	intervention	programme.	It	also	will	involve	professionals	collecting	information	and	sharing	it	within	and	between	services	in	order	to	identify	families	with	complex	needs.	This	involves	the	collection	of	sensitive	personal	data	by	case-workers	with	a	statutory	demand	for	secure	collection,	transfer	and	retention	of	those	data.	Current	data	storage	and	representations	of	needs	vary	across	services	and	have,	in	the	past,	proved	to	be	very	difficult	to	share	(Edwards	et	al,	2009).	
In earlier  work on practices of professional learning in and for MAS it was noted that practitioners described 
taking risks involving rule-bending as responses to contradictions between emergent practices and systems of rules, 
protocols and lines of responsibility. They demonstrated the need to question the legitimacy of the existing rules in 
relation to their professional actions on increasingly complex objects of activity and the necessity of making visible 
the ways in which they worked around the barriers to action. For example, systems of referral which meant that 
organizations passed on ‘bits of the child’, as one practitioner put it, from one to the other, were opened up for 
scrutiny and criticism of how slow the respective organizations were in enabling parallel, inter-professional 
collaboration which was more responsive to the needs of children.  Rule-bending was sometimes observed, 
reflecting practitioners’ frustrations about the responsiveness of systems to new demands of child-centred 
collaborations. These were likely to be a matter of by-passing organisational hierarchies in order to make direct 
contact with the practitioner in another service who could help quickly. 
IMPLICATIONS	OF	THE	CASE	STUDIES	So	what	can	we	conclude	from	these	very	different	and	very	exceptional	case	studies?	While	they	are	very	extreme	events	and	very	different	in	their	nature,	they	are	the	very	things	that	test	the	capability	of	our	trusted	services	to	act	properly	when	called	upon	to	do	so.	Those	services	are	intended	and	strategically	planned	to	be	able	to	cope	with	and	respond	to	these	extreme	and	serious	situations.	The	procedures,	policies	and	ways	of	working	are	there	to	ensure	that	they	deliver	the	services	that	we	must	rely	upon.	Consequently,	we	are	very	concerned	when	we	find	that	there	are	some	very	common	properties	of	each,	that	transcend	the	differences,	and	which	we	have	observed	in	further	situations.		Each	of	these	case	studies	is	an	example	of	what	has	been	termed	complex	and	wicked	problems	where	the	nature	of	the	problem	itself	is	never	fully	understood	“sometimes	only	after	the	event,	as	in	the	case	of	Baby	“Peter	(in	which	the	mistreatment	leading	to	the	death	of	Peter	by	his	carers	occurred	despite	repeated	visits	by	various	social,	welfare,	health	and	other	services	in	the	UK)	and	at	other	times	not	even	after	the	event.	The	nature	of	each	of	these	case	studies,	and	the	nature	of	complex	wicked	problems	is	that	a	known	answer,	from	a	known	expert	is	not	appropriate	or	available	since	the	nature	of	the	problem	itself	is	not	understood.	Only	through	the	unfolding	of	attempts	to	take	action	is	the	nature	of	the	problem	further	disclosed.	This	brings	with	it	a	number	of	consequences;		1. The	failure	to	notice,	report	and	share	what	turns	out	to	have	been	important	data.	This	often	occurs	through	preconceived	notions	of	what	is	relevant	in	the	individual	or	the	culture	and	processes	of	the	organisations.			2. The	lack	of	agility	and	the	reluctance	or	fear	of	trying	something	new	that	is	outside	the	known	bounds	of	practice.	This	occurs	through	structural	pressures	on	the	individual	and	organisation,	and	the	lack	of	a	mechanism	to	sanction,	assure	or	approve	such	actions.	3. The	failure	of	the	whole	to	learn	rapidly	during	the	event.	This	occurs	through	rigid	and	stove-piped	lines	of	communication,	false	or	non-reporting	in	order	to	comply,	to	avoid	rebuke,	and/or	to	save	time	and	get	on	with	it.	4. An	over	reliance	upon	the	formal,	established,	specialist,	resources	and	processes	and	an	inability	to	make	effective	use	of	the	“unofficial”,	novel,	and	available.	This	occurs	through	the	misplaced	ownership	of	the	problem	being	in	the	hands	of	a	few.		
5. The	resultant	breakthroughs	that	contribute	to	solution	and	future	ways	of	working	come	from	outside	the	current	known	expertise,	processes,	and	responsibilities.				6. The	mechanisms	to,	share,	question,	reflect	and	propose	alternatives	are	not	available	to	all	but	a	few	and	often	in	highly	abstracted	and	prescribed	forms.	This	occurs	from	the	lack	of	trust,	fear	of	“information	overload”,	the	lack	of	light-weight	mechanisms,	and	the	inability	to	construct	“provenance”	from	novel	sources.	7. The	nature	of	leadership	and	command	is	often	rigid,	inflexible	and	prescriptive.	This	occurs	from	a	belief	that	command	and	leaders	must	always	appear	to	know	the	right	answer	and	be	the	ultimate	experts.	This	results	in	the	suppression	of	new	ideas,	improved	problem	solving,	and	prevents	a	culture	of	empowered	discovery.		8. The	processes	and	tools	are	often	inappropriate	and	inflexible	and	the	ability	to	appropriate	new	or	changed	tools	and	processes	is	poor.	This	occurs	from	the	lack	of	available	easily	reconfigured	and	adaptable	tools	and	processes	and	the	inability	to	allow	appropriation	of	external	tools	and	processes	for	fear	of	“damaging	the	system”.		
Meeting	those	Challenges	We	hypothesise	that	new	processes	and	technologies	can	enable	Collective	Capability	by	providing	improved	creation	gathering,	representation	and	sharing	of	information	that	enhance:	
• local	and	global		awareness	of	individuals,	teams		and	agencies	in	the	collective,	
- enhancing	the	power	and	utility	of	information	knowledge	sharing,	
- improving	the	ease	of	collection,	richness	and	rapid	assessment	of	locally	gathered	information	for	global	learning.	
• decision-making	and	decision-making	process	i.e.	
- Improving	the	production	and	sharing	information	by	individuals	and	groups,		
- Improve	the	collective	analysis	and	assessment	of	that	information,	We	believe	that	this	will	to	lead	to	improvements	in	MAS	collective	capability	in	terms	of;	improved	capability,	and	greater	effectiveness.	More	specifically,	we	postulate	that	greater	shared	awareness	and	utility	of	information,	collective	analysis	and	assessment	for	decision-making	will	increase	the	capability	and	agility	of	MAS.	It	is	important	to	note	that	these	effects	will	also	be	complex	i.e.	greater	shared	awareness	will	affect	collective	analysis	and	assessment	for	decision	making,	more	collective	decision	making	will	in	turn	lead	to	greater	shared	awareness.	Collective	Capability	will	produce	collaborative,	agile,	responsive,	and	efficient	collaborative	working.	To	achieve	this	research	must	investigate	the	socio-technological,	environmental	and	contextual	factors	that	support	collective	capability	in	MAS.		Such	research	must	employ	a	range	of	theoretical	and	methodological	perspectives.	We	argue	that	much	understanding	and	insight	is	to	be	gained	from	bringing	together	Activity	Theory,	Collective	Intelligence	and	Human	Computer	Interaction	theory	and	methods	to	understand	the	interaction	between	the	processes,	technologies,	the	end	users,	their	work	and	Collective	Capability.		
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